WOLCHER - LAST REVISION

4/11/2006 8:53 PM

A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION INTO METHODS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
Louis E. Wolcher *

Most constitutional theorists in America and Britain are
primarily interested in the contents of their respective
constitutions. They pay less attention (and in Britain far less
attention) to the methods that judges employ to derive those
contents, and almost no attention to the philosophical aspects of
judges’ interpretive methods. This article attempts to redress
this imbalance by giving a distinctly philosophical description of
the principal methods of constitutional interpretation that judges
are inclined to follow in these two countries, and by developing
the important distinction between the interpretation and the
reception of a constitutional text.
The act of interpretation is active and rational; the event of
reception is passive and pre-rational.
In a sense, the
phenomenon of reception makes every judge into a kind of
“strict textualist” at some point in the interpretive process.
Rather than seeking to criticize the many competing methods of
constitutional interpretation, or to decide which one is “best,”
this article merely seeks to understand them for what they are.
The result is a comparative law exposition that is simultaneously
legal and philosophical.

I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPT OF “METHODS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION”
As the highest level of positive law within the state, a “constitution”
in the general sense of the word prescribes and establishes the basic
structures of government, including the organs and processes of law
*
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creation and law enforcement. The constitution also can, and usually
does, prescribe or preclude the contents of future statutes and other types
of governmental action in three distinct ways: (1) by allocating
competencies amongst the different branches of the national government
(balance of powers); (2) by establishing the boundaries which separate
the authority of the national government from that of sub-national units
of government (federalism); and (3) by codifying certain individual (and
even group) rights and liberties that government is bound to respect and
enforce (human rights).1 Although the distinction between method and
result is sometimes difficult to discern and maintain, this article does not
concern itself so much with the contents of the constitutions of the
United States and the United Kingdom as with the methods of
interpretation that are used to produce specific contents from the texts
that comprise the constitutions. The article’s goals are twofold: first, to
give concise philosophical descriptions (or interpretations) of these
methods, primarily from a Wittgensteinean point of view;2 and second,
to advance our understanding of the problem of judicial methods in
general by comparing the practices of constitutional interpretation
followed in the United States with those followed in the United
Kingdom. Of course, many different social actors have occasion to
interpret the constitution for a variety of public and private purposes: for
example, several U.S. Presidents have publicly defended their vetoes of
certain pieces of legislation on the ground that they regarded the
measures in question to be unconstitutional. That said, however, we will
focus in this article on judicial methods for interpreting the constitution,
inasmuch as they are more readily accessible and transparent than the
methods used by non-judicial actors, as well as more significant in terms
of their impact on the legal system.
The most obvious formal difference between the Constitution of the
United States and that of the United Kingdom is that the former is
1
HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 64-65 (Bonnie
Litschewski Paulson & Stanley Paulson trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (1934).
2
One of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century, Ludwig Wittgenstein has
had a considerable influence on legal theory and the philosophy of law in America,
especially when it comes to thinking about what it means to “follow” a legal rule. His
masterwork is PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., photo. reprint,
MacMillan Co. 1964) (1953) [hereinafter WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS], and one of his most powerful discussions of rule following is
contained in pages 80e-88e of that work. For a representative collection of articles about
the relevance of Wittgenstein’s philosophy to legal problems, see generally
WITTGENSTEIN AND LAW (Dennis Patterson ed., 2004).
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codified in a single text, whereas the latter is derived from a large
number of sources: statutes, common law, royal prerogatives, unwritten
customs and conventions, and treaties such as the European Convention
on Human Rights. From the standpoint of the theory of interpretation,
however, this difference is not as significant as what the judiciaries of
both nations have in common: namely, American and British judges
alike always take something as their object of interpretation when they
are engaged in the project of construing the constitution. Whether this
constitutional “object” is a discrete and well-defined document (as in the
U.S.) or the widely accepted expression of a traditional set of written and
unwritten institutional arrangements (as in the U.K.), the event of
judicial interpretation always exhibits three formally distinct elements:
(1) a constitutional “text” — an object of interpretation — in the largest
sense of the word; (2) a second text — the interpretation as such —
which the judge wishes to derive from the canonical constitutional text;
and (3) the explicit or implicit method of interpretation with which the
judge makes the passage from (1) to (2).
It almost goes without saying that constitutional interpretations are
also a product of history, including the social factors that make the
interpreter the person that she is and that predetermine the realm of legal
answers that she experiences as plausible. To pursue this line of
thinking, however, is to adopt what Ronald Dworkin calls the “external
point of view of the sociologist or historian” rather than the “internal
point of view” of the judge who must decide a case.3 In other words, the
causes of a decision are not the same as its grounds, even if the very
project of justifying judicial results can be interpreted as biased or
ideological from certain political points of view. Thus, while the
concept of history imputes judicial decisions to their causes, in this
article the concept of methods of interpretation gives an internal account
of the different techniques that judges employ to justify and ground their
decisions. Of course any given court decision may or may not make its
interpretive method explicit. Indeed, judicial opinions sometimes deploy
several logically distinct methods in the same case, without discussing
how the methods work together or even whether their premises are
consistent with one another. For reasons of analytical clarity, therefore,
this article will separately describe the most important methods of
constitutional interpretation as ideal types — logical tools for identifying

3

RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 13 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE].
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and classifying the various interpretive strategies that can be found in the
reports of real cases.
As Wittgenstein was the first to notice,4 the discipline of projective
geometry is an apt metaphor for thinking about the important distinction
between the method and the contents of an interpretation. Think of the
linguistic expression of a particular constitutional text — one that has
not yet undergone interpretation in a particular case before a judge — as
if it were a two-dimensional shape lying on a plane. Imagine, for
example, that the phrase “due process of law,” which appears in both the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States, were like figure A in plane I in the following drawing:

The sense of the metaphor, in a nutshell, is just this: understanding how
a judge has interpreted (or will interpret) the meaning of “due process of
law” is analogous to the task of understanding how a geometer might
project figure A onto plane II. Just as there are, in principle, infinite
methods of projection in projective geometry (both orthogonal and nonorthogonal), so too there is at least a plenitude of methods for
interpreting the meaning of the linguistic signs “due process of law”:
original intent, the plain meaning of the language, the underlying
purpose of the words, following precedent, and so forth. In the case of
geometry, it is easy to see that the shape of the figure that is projected
onto plane II from plane I depends on which method is used: as the
drawing shows, hypothetical method M1 (which is orthogonal) produces
figure A1, whereas hypothetical method M2 (which is non-orthogonal)
yields the different figure A2. The same kind of thing holds true in the
case of interpreting legal language. A phrase like “due process of law”
will receive one kind of interpretation if the judge adheres to the method
4

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR 205 (Rush Rhees ed. & Anthony
Kenny trans. 1974) [hereinafter WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR].
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of ascertaining and following the text’s “original intent,” and a different
kind of interpretation if the judge decides to follow well-established
precedent without regard to whether past cases are consistent with what
the first interpreter would call the text’s original intent. And even if the
ultimate legal result of a particular case happens to be the same
regardless of which theory of interpretation is used, the process of
getting there and the judge’s explanation of the result are both functions
(in a quasi-mathematical sense) of the method she uses.
For present purposes, the most important thing to notice about the
metaphor of projection is that one cannot infer or judge the nature of
figure A just by looking at its projections (A1 and A2) alone. Instead,
one also needs to know the method of projection, and only with this
information in hand can one infer the nature of figure A from figures A1
or A2. Just as it would be mathematically naive to ask whether figures
A1 and A2 are “accurate projections” of figure A without knowing the
techniques according to which they were produced, so too it is
philosophically naive to ask whether a given statement about the
meaning of the constitution is “correct” without knowing the technique
according to which it was produced and applied.
This procedure for thinking about constitutional interpretation has
the advantage of focusing attention on the political and jurisprudential
issues associated with a judge’s selection of an interpretive method —
issues which logically precede, shape, and can even predetermine the
results of constitutional litigation. To illustrate: whether there are such
things as non-enumerated rights in the U.S. Constitution (including the
so-called “right to privacy” that lies at the legal heart, so to speak, of the
abortion controversy in America) cannot logically depend on what the
constitutional content “says” when considered apart from any method of
reading or hearing what it says. So long as there is a category difference
between a legal rule and its application there will always be a human
being who “listens” to what the text has to say according to some
method, however rudimentary it may be. The main point is that disputes
about the meaning of the constitution in a given context very often cover
over and obscure the existence of more fundamental disagreements
about the appropriate method or methods for determining meaning.
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II. JUDICIAL VERSUS LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY ON THE
MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION
Ever since Chief Justice John Marshall declared, in Marbury v.
Madison, “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is,”5 Supreme Court interpretations of
the United States Constitution have enjoyed a very high level of
immunity from revision by legislation and executive action. While the
Supreme Court derives its institutional authority to interpret the
Constitution solely from the existence of a concrete case or controversy
within the meaning of Article III,6 almost all legislative and executive
officials at both the federal and state levels have come to accept the
Court’s constitutional holdings as authoritative, almost as if they were
extensions of the constitutional text itself. Among other things, this
implies that the Court has (or has been ceded) the power to hold federal
and state statutes unconstitutional in cases within its jurisdiction that
properly present the question of constitutionality, and when the Court
does so the implementation of the legislative program in question is
frequently stopped cold in its tracks. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
invalidated more than 150 statutory provisions during the past hundred
years alone.7 Of course there are some cases in which the Court itself
will defer to another branch of government on questions of constitutional
interpretation (the judicially created “political question” doctrine), and
every now and then commentators and public officials have asserted that
there is really no authoritative interpreter of the Constitution in the
United States, and that each branch of government has a co-equal duty
and right to interpret the Constitution as it sees fit in the performance of
its official duties.8 Other commentators claim, more cautiously and with
greater plausibility, that there is simply no definitive theoretical answer
to the question whether there is a single authoritative interpreter of the
Constitution in the United States.9 Theory aside, however, it is widely
accepted as a matter of custom and legal culture that only the
cumbersome and lengthy amendment processes specified in Article V of

5

5 U.S. 137, 177 (1805).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
7
Martha Neil, Cases & Controversies: Some Decisions Are All the Rage — Literally,
ABA J. 41 (Oct. 2005).
8
Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 985-86 (1987).
9
Erwin Chemerinsky, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 32 (2d ed.
2002).
6
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the Constitution can overturn a Supreme Court decision that renders a
specific and unqualified constitutional interpretation.10
It is obvious that the relative degree of finality of Supreme Court
decisions on the meaning of the Constitution must be distinguished from
their infallibility, for as Justice Robert Jackson famously remarked in
Brown v. Allen, “We are not final because we are infallible, but we are
infallible only because we are final.”11 Nevertheless, the fact of finality
raises the stakes, both politically and jurisprudentially, on the question of
how the Supreme Court does or should go about the task of
interpretation. In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, the stakes are
much smaller than in the United States on the question of which methods
of interpretation judges do or should employ in deciding cases that raise
constitutional issues. This is because the British Constitution consists of
a polyglot of texts and arrangements that can always be supplemented,
revised, and even repealed by Parliament.12 In short, in the United
Kingdom the contents of the Constitution (as interpreted by the courts)
are subordinate to the principle of legislative supremacy, whereas in the
United States it is the other way around. This is why it is often said,
albeit with some overstatement, that in the United States the Constitution
is what the Supreme Court says it is, but in Britain the Constitution is
what Parliament says it is. It is no wonder that American lawyers,
judges, and legal academics pay a great deal of attention to methods of
constitutional interpretation: as a practical matter these methods replace
the political process as the primary external (or “objective”) constraint
on judicial authority to say what the law of the Constitution is. As a
consequence of the foregoing factors, questions concerning the proper
method of constitutional interpretation occupy a much greater role in
American academic and political thought than they do in the United
Kingdom, and, not surprisingly, the American literature on the subject is
significantly larger. To the extent that questions of constitutional
interpretation do arise in Britain, they tend not to be different in
principle than questions of statutory interpretation or common law
development generally. For that reason this article will devote most of
its attention to the various interpretive methods used and debated within
the United States, and will return to the case of the United Kingdom only

10

See generally U.S. CONST. art. V.
344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953).
12
See CONSTITUTIONS OF MODERN STATES: SELECTED TEXTS
(Leslie Wolf-Phillips ed., 1968).
11
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after the main problems and lines of controversy concerning the
interpretation of the American Constitution have been clarified.

III. METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN
THE UNITED STATES
It is of course factually possible for a judge consciously to
manipulate the techniques of constitutional interpretation so as to justify
a result that she has reached on purely personal grounds, and
undoubtedly this has occurred more than a few times during the long
history of American constitutional law. But pretending to interpret is not
the same as interpreting, and this article is concerned with describing
and evaluating only the latter activity, leaving for another day the task of
developing a philosophically robust account of the phenomenon of
pretence in the American judicial system. Thus, we will henceforth
focus our attention on the paradigmatic situation of a judge who seeks in
good faith to determine what she takes to be the “command of the
Constitution” and to apply the meaning of this command to a particular
dispute without consciously attempting to smuggle in her own personal
values and preferences. Although it is obviously true that such values
and preferences affect the result through psychological and social
mechanisms of which the judge who acts in good faith is unaware, it
bears repeating that this article seeks to analyze the internal point of
view of judges who wish to ground their interpretations and not the
external point of view of social scientists and historians who wish to
explain judicial behavior by its causes.
As the previous remarks may suggest, the purely psychological
hallmark of a genuine act of judicial interpretation is the judge’s
conscious submission to an authority that is external to herself — in this
case, the text of the Constitution as mediated through one or more
methods of interpretation that the judge employs to construe it. Indeed,
the formula Legal Text + Method of Interpretation + Good Faith
Judicial Work = Legal Meaning formally describes none other than the
structure of the much-vaunted value, in democratic societies at least, of
the rule of law itself. In the United States, primarily because of the
earlier-noted general acceptance of judicial supremacy on matters of
constitutional interpretation, the subject of judges’ interpretive practices
in construing the Constitution looms large both in political discourse and
in legal theory. Just as American political rhetoric frequently opposes
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the figure of the “strict constructionist” to that of the “judicial activist,”
so too the theory of interpretation opposes “originalism” and
“textualism” to another set of methods that can be called,
simultaneously, both “non-originalist” and “constructivist.” Given that
submission to an external constraint on the determination of meaning is
both a logical and psychological precondition of the activity known as
“legal interpretation,” the debate in America about which method is best
or most appropriate in a constitutional democracy is not, strictly
speaking, about a choice between lawfulness and lawlessness in judicial
decision making. Rather, this debate refers to a choice amongst
interpretive constraints, all of which are external and law-like in Herbert
Wechsler’s precise sense of the term “neutral principles”: rational
criteria of sufficient neutrality and generality to cover many other cases
in the future, as opposed to naked “act[s] of willfulness or will” that seek
only to establish a particular result in one case.13 That a judge’s
submission to a particular interpretive constraint can (and usually does)
produce a variety of social and political consequences is obvious; but it
must be stressed again that this article seeks to understand the
interpretive process as such — i.e., as a phenomenon — rather than to
subject it to social criticism.
A. Strict Textualism
Since we have left the phenomenon of judicial pretense for another
day, it behooves us to ask what a judge who in good faith employs a
“textualist” method of interpretation actually does in the course of
generating constitutional meaning. In this article we are interested in
understanding the activity that certain judges call “textualism,” leaving
to more metaphysically inclined minds the task of deciding whether
textualism is “really” possible or true. With Wittgenstein, we will not
try to specify the act of interpretation by means of the object that is
interpreted, but rather by the technique of interpretation.14 I must
emphasize that an investigation of common methods of interpretation is
not the same as an investigation of the common opinions of those who
follow them. The “truths” of law are not determined by a consensus of
opinion, for the opinion that “X” means Y, however widespread, does
not tell us how the sign “Y” itself is interpreted and applied. As
13

Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 9, 11 (1959).
14
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, WITTGENSTEIN’S LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHICAL
PSYCHOLOGY, 1946-47, at 48 (P.T. Geach ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1989) (1988).
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Wittgenstein puts it, an answer to the question “How is that meant?”
merely “exhibits the relationship between two linguistic expressions.”15
No, what is called a technique or method of constitutional interpretation
is not determined by a consensus of opinion, but rather by a consensus of
action:
There is no opinion at all; it is not a question of opinion.
They [the truths of logic] are determined by a consensus
of action: a consensus of doing the same thing, reacting
the same way. There is a consensus but it is not a
consensus of opinion. We all act the same way, walk the
same way, count the same way.16
Thus, if we notice that there are two methods of interpreting the same
expression in the Constitution, we should not take this to mean that the
expression has “two meanings”; rather, we should take it to mean that in
applying the same expression people just proceed according to different
methods. Period. To put our motives succinctly, we simply draw
attention to what judges are really doing and refrain from making any
grand claims about the meaning of the Constitution.17
To begin our investigation of textualism, it should be noted that
although it is quite common for judges in constitutional cases to read one
provision of the constitution in light of another, this kind of intra-textual
hermeneutics is not what most American lawyers mean when they speak
of “strict textualism” in constitutional law. What is more, although
textualism and originalism are often conflated, sometimes under the
label “interpretivism,” they are nonetheless analytically distinct
methods. To be sure, it is possible to identify a mode of “textual”
interpretation at work in decisions that inquire into the meaning that the
words of the Constitution had for “the framers” or for the “average
person in the street in 1789.” But the latter method is best called
originalism rather than textualism, because in its purest form strict
textualism is inconsistent with any kind of interpretation, including even
interpretation according to the original intent of the framers. In a
nutshell, strict textualism is the belief that:
15

WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR, supra note 4, at 45.
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, WITTGENSTEIN’S LECTURES ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF
MATHEMATICS: CAMBRIDGE, 1939, at 183-84 (Cora Diamond ed., Univ. of Chi. Press
1989) (1976).
17
See FRIEDRICH WAISMANN, WITTGENSTEIN AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE 186 (Brian
McGuinness ed., Joachim Schulte & Brian McGuiness trans., 1979).
16
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[I]t is possible to put down marks so self-sufficiently
perspicuous that they repel interpretation; it is the thesis
that one can write sentences of such precision and
simplicity that their meanings leap off the page in a way
no one — no matter what his or her situation or point of
view — can ignore.18
For a judge who employs this method there is no occasion to interpret
any words and sentences that she receives as being absolutely pellucid in
relation to the dispute that she must decide. When, for example, Article
II, Section 1 of the Constitution specifies that the President’s term of
office is “four Years,” the strict textualist just receives and knows,
without experiencing the slightest doubt, that the word “Year” refers to
the amount of time that it takes the planet Earth to make one circuit
around the Sun, as opposed to, say, the amount of time that it takes the
planet Jupiter to make such a circuit, even though the linguistic sign
“Year” does not on its face “say” that the former interpretation is
correct.19
The first step towards any philosophically sophisticated
understanding of textualism is to recognize that there is a fundamental
sense in which we are all textualists, for there is an important distinction
between the interpretation and the reception of a text — any text. At its
most basic level, interpretation is the activity of transforming one
linguistic sign into another linguistic sign according to some method of
transformation. Reception, on the other hand, is the activity of using a
linguistic sign without experiencing any doubt about the sign’s role in
one’s actions. It is possible to notice the distinction between
interpretation and reception by paying close attention to what actually
happens when we respond to authoritative legal texts; if we do this,
Wittgenstein notes that “in some cases you will find that you do
something which might be called interpreting before obeying, in some
cases not.”20 For example, most native English speakers would receive
the word “Year” in Article II, Section 1 without consciously reflecting
on the possibility that it is ambiguous or vague: they would simply see

18

Stanley Fish, The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence, in THE FATE OF LAW 159,
161 (Austin Sarat & Thomas Kearns eds., 1991).
19
U.S. CONST. art. II § 1.
20
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS 3 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter
WITTGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS].
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“Year” and apply it conventionally — in an “automatic” way21 —
without any prior reflection or rational calculation. In such cases it
would be misleading to say that people “interpret” the word, or even
recognize its “meaning,” for both interpretation and meaning-recognition
are conscious processes in which a linguistic sign is seen as representing
or signifying something other than itself.
Formally speaking,
“Whenever we interpret a symbol in one way or another, the
interpretation is a new symbol added to the old one.”22 Hence the
interpretation or meaning of the sign “X” is always some other sign,
“Y,” which itself can (and indeed must) be unreflectively received in a
certain way in order to constitute the ground of subsequent human
action. Another way to put this is to say that the task of interpretation
depends on an antecedent state of doubt, regardless of the basis on which
the doubt rests, and that where there is no doubt there is also no
interpretation.
Consider a native German speaker trying to discover the length of an
American President’s term of office: imagine that she consults the text
of the Constitution but does not immediately understand the word
“Year” in Article II, Section 1 because she has little or no competence in
English. In this case she would need to translate the English word
“Year” into the German word “Jahr” (by using an English-to-German
dictionary, for example) before being able to understand or apply the
Constitution’s meaning on this point. Her act of interpretation would
consciously transform one linguistic sign (“Year”) into another linguistic
sign (“Jahr”) by means of a method of transformation (a dictionary). It
is important to recognize that the linguistic sign comprising the
translation itself (in this case “Jahr”) normally is not then further
interpreted; rather, it is simply received as a basis for action without any
further reflection. However long the act of interpretation takes, and
however detailed its product may be, there will eventually come a point
in time at which the linguistic sign that constitutes the final
interpretation of the original linguistic sign is simply understood without
more ado. Wittgenstein aptly summarizes the important distinction
between interpretation and reception by saying that one can keep on
interpreting a linguistic sign like “Year” — or for that matter any other
provision of the United States Constitution — for as long as one wants,
21

See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 123 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW].
22
WITTGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS, supra note 20, at 33.
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“[b]ut adopt whatever model or scheme you may, it will have a bottom
level, and there will be no such thing as an interpretation of that.”23
The distinction between interpretation and reception transcends the
distinction between the external and internal points of view on law. To
be sure, the way someone receives a text can always be viewed, from the
external standpoint of an observer, as being a function of history,
culture, and personal circumstance, and therefore as radically relative to
the context of the one who receives it. And it is undeniably true that the
deeds that depend upon reception, such as the application of the law to a
particular case, are at least in some sense contingent on the receiver’s
concrete social and psychological position.
Nevertheless, the
interpretation/reception distinction bridges the gap between the internal
and external points of view on law by demonstrating the limits of legal
interpretation, or rather, of what is called “legal interpretation.” It is not
a contradiction, and still less a reproach, to say that a judge’s
interpretation of a legal text is simultaneously well founded and
unfounded, for being well founded means that the interpretation follows
from the original text according to this or that accepted method of
transformation, whereas being unfounded means that the judge simply
knows how to go on — how to act — with the signs that make up the
interpretation itself without feeling the need for any additional
grounding. If the distinction between the external and the internal points
of view on law rightly draws attention to the difference between the
causes and the grounds of a judge’s decision, then the distinction
between the interpretation and the reception of a legal text stays within
the realm of grounding as such in order to avoid mythologizing it. The
latter distinction merely provides a phenomenological description of
what the judicial act of giving grounds for an interpretation actually is —
how it is lived as a phenomenon — and, in doing so, it also shows or
suggests the most that any act of grounding could possibly be.
If the phenomenon of reception proves that everyone eventually
becomes a textualist at some point in the interpretive process (if only at
the last point), then someone who calls herself a strict textualist simply
stops the interpretive process before it begins, without pursuing the
white rabbit of doubt down the interpretive rabbit hole. The words of
the Constitution mean exactly what they “tell” the strict textualist they
mean in an initial event of reception that is devoid of all doubt and that
is missing any self-conscious extraction of meaning. This event of
23

Id. at 34.
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reception can be profitably compared to the phenomenon of seeing only
one aspect of an ambiguous figure. In the context of a well-known
gestalt drawing called the duck-rabbit, for example, it is possible to see
what the picture represents in at least two different aspects. If you look
at it one way, it appears to be a rabbit; but if you look at it another way,
it appears to be a duck:

In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein notes that there may be
certain people who have always seen this figure as, say, a rabbit, and
have never seen it in any other way.24 For them the figure would clearly
be the picture of a rabbit and only a rabbit. Indeed, Wittgenstein also
observes that there could even be people who are “blind” to the
possibility of seeing the figure as a duck despite having the figure’s
ambiguity pointed out to them in no uncertain terms. The twin
phenomena of seeing-as and aspect blindness are perfect metaphors for
understanding the event of reception as it is experienced by the strict
textualist: she is like someone who is capable of seeing the figure of the
duck-rabbit in only one of its aspects, and who goes on to insist that it
“clearly and plainly means” only this one thing. Such a person would
suffer from an absence of imagination (or any sense of ambiguity) that is
analogous to aspect blindness. She would tend to judge non-standard
interpretations of what she calls clear linguistic signs like duck-rabbits as
plainly wrong and irrational rather than as just plain different. To
borrow Catherine MacKinnon’s extremely apt phrase, strict textualists

24

WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 2, at 194e.
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usually represent their own point of view on the meaning of the
Constitution as the “standard for point-of-viewlessness.”25
If called upon to justify the resulting decision, the strict textualist
will assert that her method is the quintessential example of judicial
restraint, inasmuch as it follows the explicit words written down by the
framers of the Constitution itself rather than attempting to alter the
meaning of those words by an act of interpretation that by definition
supplements the authoritative language of the Constitution with language
written by unelected judges.26 In this respect strict textualism can
profitably be compared to those forms of religious fundamentalism
whose adherents believe that holy texts are the words of God that do not
need to be interpreted by human beings in order to be immediately
understood. That strict textualists, like religious fundamentalists,
sometimes (or often) disagree among themselves about what the
canonical text “says” is of course a function of the fact that history
touches everyone at least somewhat differently in distributing its effects,
just as a widespread consensus about meaning shows that history often
produces similar effects amongst similarly situated people. That said,
however, it is important to understand that any subsequent agreements or
disagreements about the contents of received meanings are not, strictly
speaking, ingredients of the phenomenon of reception itself, without
which no text could ever become an element of human behavior. If, as
some of their critics say, strict textualists are uncritical and linguistically
naive in approaching the beginning of the judicial process, then the point
of bringing out the difference between interpretation and reception is to
show that in the end they behave just like everyone else. As
Wittgenstein puts it, “When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the
rule blindly.”27
B. Originalism
The so-called “strict originalist” determines meaning according to
two and only two criteria: (1) the literal text of the Constitution; and (2)
25

Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOC’Y 635, 638-39
(1983).
26
See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Ely’s Theory of Judicial Review, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 87 (1981)
(“[A]ctivist judicial review is inconsistent with democratic theory because it substitutes
the policy choices of unelected, unaccountable judges for those of the people’s
representatives.”); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 3-4 (Fall 1971).
27
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 2, at 85e.
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the specific intent of those who drafted and/or ratified that text. The
origin of this attitude towards legal interpretation can be traced to
Aristotle, who argued in the Nicomachean Ethics that in cases of doubt
about the meaning of a law a judge should endeavor “to say what the
legislator himself would have said had he been present, and would have
put into his law if he had known.”28 Thus, from the standpoint of strict
originalists like dissenting Justice George Sutherland in Home Building
& Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, “[t]he whole aim of construction, as applied
to a provision of the Constitution, is…to ascertain and give effect to the
intent of its framers and the people who adopted it.”29 For judges like
Sutherland, the surest guide to authorial intent is to read the words of the
Constitution for the norms that they state or clearly imply,30 and in this
respect most strict originalists are also textualists, at least with respect to
those portions of the Constitution that they receive (without doubt) as
being clear in meaning. As for those provisions of the Constitution that
virtually everyone admits are vague or ambiguous (“equal protection”
and “necessary and proper,” to cite two examples), the strict originalist
looks solely at the written historical record of the context in which the
text in question was proposed and ratified in order to determine what the
framers and/or those who ratified the provision must have had in mind as
its specific purpose.31 For example, a perfectly consistent strict
originalist construing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment would find it highly relevant, if not conclusive, that the
congressmen who ratified this provision in 1866 also approved of formal
legal segregation by race in the public schools of the District of
Columbia. She might very well say that this evidence of Congress’s
specific intent in 1866 does not allow the Supreme Court to declare (as it
did in Brown v. Board of Education), that public school segregation
violates the Equal Protection Clause, even if it is true that general
28

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729, 1796
(Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984).
29
290 U.S. 398, 453 (1934).
30
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1
(1980).
31
See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
Although it is important to
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 9-11 passim (1997).
distinguish the specific intent of the drafters of a constitutional provision (Berger’s point
of reference) from the historical practices and understandings of the time from which one
may deduce authorial intent as a general matter (Scalia’s point of reference), in the end
these two approaches both proceed on the assumption that the meaning of the
Constitution is fixed once and for all by the historical intent of the framers. See Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 U. HAW.
L.REV. 385 (2000).
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American attitudes about the legitimacy of racial apartheid have changed
since the nineteenth century.32 From the standpoint of strict originalism
the meaning of the Constitution is immutably fixed by its language and
its specific historical intent, and the only legitimate way for
constitutional meaning to change is through the process of formal
amendment.
The strict originalist, like the textualist, believes that her method for
interpreting the Constitution is the only one that is consistent with the
democratic value of majority rule: if “We the People” (i.e. propertied
white male citizens) made most of the basic constitutional rules in 1789
and 1791, then the different “we the people” of 2005 have no alternative
but to live with their predecessors’ choices unless and until they are able
to assemble the legislative supermajorities necessary for a constitutional
amendment.33
To be sure, the Constitution contains numerous
constraints on the democratic principle of majority rule, and numerous
protections of individual rights and liberties against majoritarian abuse.
Yet from the point of view of a strict originalist the scope of these
constraints, rights, and liberties is the product of what the text says and
what those who adopted it intended it to mean. In Wilson v. Arkansas,
Justice Clarence Thomas furnished an excellent example of how this
method works in practice when he ruled for the Court that police officers
must “knock and announce” before searching a residence, not because
the right to privacy outweighs the needs of law enforcement in such
cases, or because such a result follows from precedent, but because this
particular requirement happens to have been the state of the law in 1791,
when the Fourth Amendment was ratified.34 Since federal judges are not
elected but rather appointed for life, the strict originalist thinks that
federal judges have no duty and no right to make value choices that are
different from those the framers made.35 Whenever the Supreme Court
declares an area of social or individual life “off limits” to legislative
32

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See U.S. CONST. pmbl. For an explanation of the strict originalist viewpoint, see,
e.g., Bork, supra note 26, at 3-6 (Originalism is democratic because the “people”
consented to the adoption of the Constitution, and “a Court that makes rather than
implements value choices cannot be squared with the presuppositions of a democratic
society.”); Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can
Originalist Interpretation be Justified?, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1482, 1484-85 (1985).
34
514 U.S. 927 (1995).
35
See Bork, supra note 26, at 4-6. See also Edward J. Melvin, Judicial Activism: The
Violation of an Oath, 27 CATH. LAW. 283, 284 (1982) (“[W]hen a judge takes his oath to
uphold the Constitution he promises to carry out the intention of its framers.”).
33

WOLCHER - LAST REVISION

18

Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law

4/11/2006 8:53 PM

[Vol. 13:2

interference, its decision pro tanto chills or annihilates the normal
exercise of democratic processes in that area. Hence the theory of strict
originalism also maintains that when the constitutional text is silent on
the question of whether a particular legal right exists the courts have no
business declaring that it does, and must defer to the action (or acquiesce
in the inaction) of Congress and state legislatures concerning the subject
matter in question.
Not all self-identified originalists adhere to every tenet of strict
originalism. It is possible to identify a kind of moderate originalism in
American jurisprudence that, although it agrees with strict originalism
on the proposition that the meaning of the Constitution is fixed by its
language and the framers’ historical intent, takes a broader view of what
constitutes that intent.36 Since judges always deal with constitutional
rules that are meant to be general in scope, and since the original intent
of the framers must be described at some level of generality, this means
that the judge’s choice of the relevant level of generality will usually
determine the result of a case or line of cases. That judges have
discretion to choose the level of generality with which they characterize
precedent is a feature of the interpretive process that has been well
known at least since the early days of American Legal Realism.37
Moderate originalists simply apply this basic insight to the context of
characterizing the intent of the framers. To combat the apparently
unbridled judicial discretion that the choice of the level of generality
seems to entail, strict originalists like Justice Antonin Scalia have called
for the framers’ intent to be determined at the most specific level of
abstraction, so as to leave open the largest possible space for subsequent
legislative discretion.38 However, it is precisely at this point that
moderate originalism distinguishes itself from the strict form of this
method: the former stands ready to construe authorial intent more
generally than the latter, at least in certain cases, especially those
involving the protection of individual rights.
Thus, for example, a moderate originalist might reject an
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment such as that given by the Court
36

See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204, 205 (1980) (Claiming that moderate originalists are “more concerned with the
adopters’ general purposes than with their intentions in a very precise sense”).
37
See Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 ABA JOURNAL 71, 72-73 (1927).
38
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (plurality
opinion); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 45 (1997).
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in Olmstead v. United States, which permitted the government to place
warrantless wiretaps on telephones primarily on the ground that the
technologies of telephones and wiretapping were completely unknown in
1791 and hence are not mentioned in the text of the amendment or in its
historical record.39 Instead, the moderate originalist might favor an
interpretation that describes the framers’ intent as keeping “the state out
of constitutionally protected areas until it has reason to believe that a
specific crime has been or is being committed.”40 If it is true, as the
Court in Olmstead observed, that the framers of the Fourth Amendment
intended to protect “material things” such as persons, houses, papers,
and effects from unwarranted governmental intrusion, it is no less true
that they also intended to protect certain “areas of private life”: the
former was their intended means, while the latter was their intended end.
The difference between these two descriptions does not consist in the
one being true and the other false, but rather in the level of generality
that is chosen to describe (accurately in both cases) what the framers’
intent was. To borrow Ronald Dworkin’s important distinction, the
moderate originalist relies on the framers’ general “concepts” rather than
their particular “conceptions,”41 thereby allowing judges to interpret the
meaning of the Constitution so as to respond to changing historical
circumstances without precipitating the need for a constitutional
amendment every time a hitherto unforeseen technology or social
phenomenon arises. In this respect moderate originalism shares with
non-originalist modes of interpretation at least a certain degree of
acceptance of Chief Justice Marshall’s well-known dictum, in
McCulloch v. Maryland, that “we must never forget that it is a
constitution we are expounding…a constitution, intended to endure for
ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs.”42
Finally, it should be noted that there is another kind of originalism
that agrees with the general premise that the determination of
constitutional meaning should be guided by original intent, but that
39

277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967) (effectively overruling Olmstead, 277
U.S. 438 (1928)).
41
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134 (1977). See also Paul Brest, The
Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 Yale L.J. 1063, 1091-92 (1980-81) (“The fact is that all
adjudication requires making choices among the levels of generality on which to
articulate principles, and all such choices are inherently non-neutral.”).
42
17 U.S. 316, 407, 415 (1819).
40
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distinguishes itself from the positivistic bent of strict originalism by
appealing to the alleged natural law underpinnings of the Constitution.
Despite the fact that the founders had to make certain compromises that
were inconsistent with natural law in order to induce the slave-holding
states to ratify the Constitution, “natural law originalists” observe that
the general intellectual milieu of the educated elite in the late 1700s, as
well as important founding documents such as the Declaration of
Independence, the Preamble to the Constitution, and the Federalist
Papers, are all replete with explicit and implicit references to natural
law.43 From this evidence of the intellectual history surrounding the
adoption of the Constitution they draw the conclusion that the original
intent of the framers was to write a text the ultimate purpose of which
was to achieve the ends of government as described by a certain
enlightenment conception of natural law — one which embraces
fundamental values such as the consent of the governed, the rule of law,
separation of powers, and individual rights.44 Therefore, natural law
originalists believe that courts can and should interpret the text of the
Constitution in light of its natural law purposes — not because (or just
because) this is the morally right thing to do, but because this was how
the authors of the Constitution themselves conceived of the text’s
meaning.45
It is obvious that to be of any use in interpreting the text of the
Constitution, original intent in any of its many forms must be expressed
in language. That is, “original intent” must find its way into another
text, exterior to the primary constitutional text, which judges consult in
order to ascertain the meaning of the latter. Once a judge determines it,
the linguistic expression of “original intent” — whether in its strict,
moderate or natural law form — will lead to different outcomes
depending on the method by which it in turn is interpreted. In other
words, the legally relevant constitutional text “X” can indeed be
interpreted in light of original intent “Y,” but the passage from the latter
to the application of the Constitution in a real case creates a brand new
problem of interpretation. Indeed, one might even be tempted to
suppose that the process of interpretation according to the tenets of
43

See generally U.S. CONST. pmbl.; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776);
THE FEDERALIST (Alexander Hamilton).
44
See Charles R. Kesler, Natural Law and a Limited Constitution, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 549, 557 (1996); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S.
CAL. L.REV. 277, 393-96 (1985).
45
Kesler, supra note 44, at 563-64.
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original intent logically leads to an infinite regress, with new symbols
together with new methods for interpreting those symbols being
generated every time an act of interpretation adds words to those that are
contained within the four corners of the object of interpretation as such.
However, this temptation should be resisted. As the previous discussion
of the phenomenon of reception shows, the process of interpretation in
fact always comes to an end at some point — the point at which there is
no doubt remaining about what the words that make up the interpretation
itself require the actor to do.46 Although many philosophers have
noticed this fact, none has expressed it more beautifully than Pascal:
Nothing, according to reason alone, is just in itself; all
changes with time. Custom creates the whole of equity,
for the simple reason that it is accepted. It is the
mystical foundation of its authority; whoever carries it
back to first principles destroys it.47
Take a look at Supreme Court opinions discussing the original intent of
the Constitution and you will find that reason’s end-point — the place
where all doubt and interpretation ceases — usually comes very soon
after the author expresses what she takes to be “original intent.”48 The
terminus of any given empirical application of the methods discussed in
this section is characterized by a judge “just knowing” (without any
further reflection) what original intent “Y” requires her to do in the case
at hand. Reason is active, while reception is passive: if the one actively
transforms “this” into “that,” the other passively accepts “that” for what
it is. Reason’s interpretations are to the phenomenon of reception as
being awake is to sleeping: one might even say that reception allows
reason to get its much-needed beauty sleep. Moreover, neither the
faculty of reason nor the reasonable could be what they are without the
46

See supra pp. 12-16.
BLAISE PASCAL, PENSÉES: THE PROVINCIAL LETTERS 101 (1941).
48
See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-34 (arguing that a survey of history
leads to the conclusion that the original intent of the Fourth Amendment requires police
to “knock and announce” before entering site to be searched and then immediately
concluding, “We now so hold”); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986)
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (referring to a survey of historical antipathy to homosexual
acts and concluding that “[t]o hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow
protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching”);
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 24-40 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(relying upon a long survey of history regarding punitive damages in civil actions to
conclude that “[s]ince jury-assessed punitive damages are a part of our living tradition
that dates back prior to 1868, I would end the suspense and categorically affirm their
validity.”).
47
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assistance of a primordial phenomenon (reception) that in itself is neither
reasonable nor unreasonable, but rather constitutes the condition of the
possibility of the linguistic opposition that we draw between the
“reasonable” and the “unreasonable.”
C. Non-Originalism
In order to avoid confusion, we will say in this article that the term
“non-originalism” refers to any purely negative theory that adopts a
posture of critical opposition to the premises and practices of originalism
and textualism. We will use the word “constructivism” to name a
number of different positive methods for interpreting the Constitution,
all of which also distinguish themselves from originalism and textualism
by giving one or more critiques of them. In other words, a nonoriginalist judge does not just reject originalism and textualism — for
this alone would leave her own constitutional interpretations
theoretically rudderless — she also necessarily accepts a different
positive method for interpreting the Constitution. In this section we will
take up the critique of originalism and textualism first, and then, in the
next section, we will discuss the three most important varieties of
constructivism: following and incrementally adapting the doctrine laid
down in precedent (evolutionism), construing the Constitution in
accordance with contemporary values (moral readings of the
constitution), and judicial policy-making (pragmatism).
The non-originalist critique of originalism and textualism begins by
noting that a truly radical purging of Supreme Court precedent would be
required in the event that these methods were to be consistently applied
to all questions of constitutional interpretation. Literally hundreds of
cases and lines of authority would have to be revisited and reconstructed
from the ground up.49 For example, over the past century and a quarter
the Supreme Court has repeatedly “incorporated” several provisions of
the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, thereby requiring state governments to respect certain
fundamental individual rights such as freedom of speech and religion
that were binding only on the federal government prior to the adoption
of the amendment.50 Moreover, the Court has done this largely without
49

See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV.
703, 710-13 (1975).
50
See, e.g., Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (right to just
compensation under Fifth Amendment); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (freedom
of speech under First Amendment); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free
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the benefit of any explicit authority in the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment or in the historical record of its adoption — a method of
proceeding that is obviously dubious, if not illegitimate, from the points
of view of both textualism and originalism.51 Nevertheless, nonoriginalists claim that the uncertainty and profound disruption of settled
expectations that would follow upon a truly radical change of these and
other precedents according to the strict tenets of originalism and
textualism would give affront to one of the most cherished values
underlying the rule of law: namely, maintaining judicial continuity in the
present with the official acts performed by judges in the past.52
As for the alleged imperative to “strictly construe” the language of
the Constitution, non-originalists also point out that numerous
difficulties and absurdities would arise if this kind of textual formalism
were applied to all parts of the Constitution. For example, are women
currently ineligible to become President of the United States because the
text of the Constitution refers to the president as “He” and because the
framers plainly intended that presidential candidates be male?53 As this
example suggests, non-originalists assert that although originalism and
textualism both claim to be democracy-enhancing (inasmuch as they try
to preclude constitutional evolution through “loose” interpretations made
by unelected judges), in practice they can operate in an anti-majoritarian
way by rigidly tying the law of the present to an outdated set of
assumptions and preferences that the vast majority of people in the
current society do not share.54 Lawrence Lessig, a non-originalist
academician, implies that there is no easy answer to the question of
which approach — originalism or non-originalism — is more consistent
with democracy when he asks, “What does fidelity [to the Constitution]
exercise of religion under First Amendment); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)
(Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel under Sixth Amendment); Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and
unusual punishments).
51
U.S. Const. amend. 14. See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 18 (noting that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to apply the Bill of Rights to the
states); Grey, supra note 49, at 711-12.
52
Grey, supra note 49, at 710.
53
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.1 (“He shall hold his Office . . . .”); see Richard B.
Saphire, Judicial Review in the Name of the Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 745,
795-97 (1983).
54
Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory: Fidelity as Translation: Fidelity
and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1416 (1997); Sanford Levinson, Law as
Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 379 (1982) (noting the “problem of explaining why
intentions of long-dead people from a different social world should influence us”).
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require when what they [the framers] presupposed is no longer
presupposed by us?”55 It has even been argued that a certain degree of
Supreme Court “activism” can be democratically justified by the fact
that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, Congress possesses
the power to make “Exceptions” to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction,
thereby ensuring at least some degree of democratic control over the
ability of the Court to impose values that the People’s representatives
reject.56
Other non-originalists point out that there is no unambiguously
knowable “intent of the framers” that could be followed, even if it were
desirable to do so.57 Determining a single intent of the framers
concerning a given provision of the Constitution is often extremely
difficult if not impossible, inasmuch as the historical record is frequently
incomplete, inaccurate, and sometimes self-contradictory. What is more,
the entities that ratified the Constitution and its amendments were not a
single author — they were collections of a large number of individuals
(for example, state legislatures and Congress). Non-originalists point
out that a collectivity cannot rightly be said to possess the attribute of
intentionality except in a purely metaphorical sense.58 Yet originalists
seem to think or pretend otherwise, thereby unjustifiably reifying
collectivities as a person-with-an-intent based on the model of a single
author.59 Some non-originalists have also noted that there is absolutely
no evidence that the framers and ratifiers of the original Constitution
believed that subsequent interpretations of their work would or should
rely on documentary sources between 1787 and 1789 to determine
constitutional meaning, and that there is, on the contrary, positive
evidence that they believed that the meaning of the Constitution would
and should only become evident over time, in response to changing
55

Lessig, supra note 54, at 1416.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING
BY THE JUDICIARY 125-39 (1982).
57
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 24.
58
See Levinson, supra note 54, at 379 (1982) (“Even literary critics most committed to
the existence of objective meaning through recovery of authorial intent . . . admit that
their approach applies only to individually authored works, and therefore cannot be used
to analyze a document like the Constitution.”); John Wofford, The Blinding Light: The
Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L.REV. 502, 508-09 (1964).
59
Compare Brest, supra note 36, at 214 (arguing that “an intentionalist must
necessarily use circumstantial evidence to educe a collective or general intent”) with
Levinson, supra note 54, at 379 (noting that the concept of authorial intent applies only
to works written by a single author).
56
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historical circumstances.60 This evidence of the original understanding
of original intent gives rise to a strange kind of logical reversal or
paradox: strictly speaking, the tenets of originalism would require judges
to be non-originalists if the framers themselves intended that future
judges would not be bound by their specific intentions and conceptions.
If, as one constitutional historian has said, the prevailing rules of
interpretation in the late eighteenth century “did not yet permit the
recourse to historical evidence that a sound theory of originalism would
require,”61 then it would seem that originalism is left hanging in the air
without any foundation other than the political will (and discretion) of
the judge who chooses to apply its methods regardless of what the
framers may have thought of them.
Another philosophical critique of textualism and originalism claims
that these methods rest on mistaken views of what I will call here the
metaphysics of interpretation.
For one thing, the theory that
constitutional provisions can have a “plain meaning” and that the
historical record can be consistent with a single “clear intent” seems to
flounder on the reality that equally competent and rational readers are
able, in good faith, to disagree about what those meanings are.
Moreover, there appears to be an ontological confusion at work in
textualism’s and originalism’s minimum premise that if there is a
widespread (or even universal) consensus among judges on how to
decide “easy” constitutional cases, then this implies, at least in these
cases, that there must be a “plain meaning” to which the words of the
Constitution or the historical records refer.62 For instance, H.L.A. Hart
correctly observes that human communication, including the regulation
of conduct by legal rules, requires a consensus in the use of language
that is broad enough to cover a large number of standard instances — a
host of “familiar, generally unchallenged cases,” as he puts it.63
However, a non-originalist would say that Hart all too readily leaps from
this simple fact to the ambiguous and doubtful conclusion that when
people use linguistic signs in a standard and unproblematic way this is

60

H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885 (1985).
61
Jack N. Rakove, The Original Intention of Original Understanding, 13 CONST.
COMMENT. 159, 175 (1996).
62
See Louis E. Wolcher, Ronald Dworkin’s Right Answers Thesis Through the Lens of
Wittgenstein, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 43, 48 (1997).
63
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 21, at 123.

WOLCHER - LAST REVISION

26

Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law

4/11/2006 8:53 PM

[Vol. 13:2

because there is a “core of settled meaning” to which the signs refer.64 If
Hart’s thesis that legal words have “core” meanings asserts the
psychological or phenomenological claim that people always experience
something called “the meaning” of a linguistic sign before they use it,
then the claim is false, as the previous discussion of the distinction
between interpretation and reception shows, and as Hart’s own reference
to “automatic” responses to easy cases appears to admit.65 On the other
hand, if Hart’s thesis holds that regularities of behavior in easy cases
must be explained by some invisible metaphysical meaning that is a
property or referent of the rule itself — as opposed to an aspect of how it
is received — then his reasoning appears to conflate the phenomenon of
grounding with the phenomenon of causal explanation.
This last point needs a bit of explanation. Although judges
frequently ground their constitutional decisions in statements about what
the Constitution means, this does not imply that the Constitution has a
metaphysically determinate “meaning” that causes them to decide as
they do. Hart commits something akin to the genetic fallacy by
assuming that regularities of behavior within a historically similar group
of people (Supreme Court justices unanimously agreeing in “easy”
cases, for instance) must be based on something more important or real
(the “meaning” of the Constitution) than the plain fact that these people
belong to a group all of whose members simply receive the
constitutional text the same way in deciding the cases in question. If a
group of people were all to look at the sky and exclaim in unison,
“There’s a bird,” we would have criteria for deciding both what their
words refer to (a small winged creature with feathers and a beak, etc.)
and where to look for it (the sky). But Hart’s only criterion for a legal
text’s meaning-the-same to many judges is that they behave the same
way in response to it. He thus provides no criterion and no evidence that
there is such a thing as the “core meaning” of a text which exists
independently of its use. It is as if I were to say that when I have a
sensation the sensation itself is a private object that I have inside my
mind — a Humean thesis that Wittgenstein rebuts decisively by giving
this famous “beetle in the box” example in the Philosophical
Investigations:

64

H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 614 (1958).
65
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 21, at 123.
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Suppose everyone has a box with something in it: we
call it a “beetle.” No one can look into anyone else’s
box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only
by looking at his beetle — Here it would be quite
possible for everyone to have something different in his
box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly
changing. — But suppose the word “beetle” had a use in
these people’s language? — If so it would not be used as
the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in
the language-game at all; not even as a something: for
the box might even be empty. — No, one can “divide
through” by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever
it is.
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the
expression of sensation on the model of “object and
name” the object drops out of consideration as
irrelevant.66
These remarks are directly relevant to Hart’s philosophical claim that
constitutional provisions “have” something called a “core meaning”: if
the words “core meaning” have a use in legal practice (as they
undoubtedly do) this is not because there is some thing — some object,
whether mental or otherwise — to which they refer. They just have a
use — period.
Nor can Hart’s thesis be rescued by calling it a Kantian regulative
idea — that is, by moving the hypothesis that constitutional language
has a “core meaning” from the realm of metaphysics to the realm of
science.67 Regulative ideas orient science to its various fields of inquiry,
and allow scientists to frame hypotheses that can, in principle, be tested,
if only with great difficulty. Thus, the law of gravity is a regulative idea
that allows us to say that a boulder would tend to fall down (not up) on
66

WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 2, at 100e.
Paul Guyer and Allen Wood describe Kant’s notion of regulative ideas (or
principles) as follows:
[T]he ideas of reason have an important function in the conduct of
natural science if they are understood regulatively, that is, if they are
taken to represent not metaphysical beings or entities whose reality is
supposed to be demonstrable, but rather goals and directions of
inquiry that mark out the ways in which our knowledge is to be
sought for and organized.
Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, Introduction, in IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE
REASON 18 (1998).
67
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planets in other galaxies, even though we have no assurance that we will
ever be able to determine that this is true by observation. Likewise, the
idea of a “self” stimulates us to search for a unified psychology, and thus
is a regulative idea for any science that takes an individual human
consciousness as its object of study. In Hart’s case, however, there
appears to be no imaginable method for testing the physical or
metaphysical hypothesis that legal language refers to a “core meaning”
other than just observing whether there is a consensus of use. But core
meanings are supposed to explain consensus of use rather than the other
way around. Moreover, even experimental evidence has shown that
people can hold fundamentally different ideas about how their language
describes the world and still be able to communicate effectively and
coordinate their behavior.68 It takes but a moment’s reflection to
observe that if someone claims that a consensus of use is “explained” by
a core meaning that is itself demonstrated only by the fact that there is a
consensus of use, then such a claim is the equivalent of saying, rather
unhelpfully, that what is to be explained is explained by what is to be
explained.
It is almost a truism to say that legal rules do not apply themselves
but rather are applied by human beings who must perform work on them
to make them yield “answers” to concrete cases. Some more radical
forms of non-originalism draw from this truth, and from the premise that
no two events or cases are ever exactly the same, the conclusion that
every act of applying the Constitution is a new and creative act that
necessarily adapts the law to what the present requires of it.69 On this

68

See Looking for a Sign, ECONOMIST, Nov. 12, 2005, at 86 (summarizing experimental
research by cognitive scientists showing the effectiveness of communication and
coordination of behavior between people who lack a common set of linguistic meanings
or references).
69
See Louis E. Wolcher, Thinking Critically About Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS,
MINORITY RIGHTS, WOMEN’S RIGHTS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 19TH WORLD CONGRESS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY
(IVR), NEW YORK, JUNE 24-30, 1999, 11, 14 (Alexander Brostl & Marijan Pavcnik eds.,
2001) (noting the “Derridaean critique of rights” which takes the form of a
“deconstruction of any discourse that pretends rights are 'present' as the endowments of
stable, rights-bearing ‘individuals’”).
Contrast this argument with FRIEDRICH
NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 298 (Walter Kaufmann, ed., Walter Kaufmann & R. J.
Hollingdale trans., Vintage Books 1968) (1967), which states:
“[T]ruth” is therefore not something there, that might be found or
discovered — but something that must be created and that gives a
name to a process, or rather a will to overcome that has in itself no
end — introducing truth, as a process in infinitum, an active
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view, a general constitutional rule can be extended by a judicial act of
will that tries to follow some method of interpreting and applying it, but
it would be a misuse of language to say that the rule’s “meaning”
consists in a demonstrable reference to every discrete happening in the
world to which the rule has been applied in the past and will be applied
in the future. In any case, non-originalism’s metaphysical critique of
originalism and textualism includes the argument that what the latter
theories take to be the “meaning” or “content” of a constitutional rule is
only the hypostasis of a finite number of random images of possible
application that happen to float through the mind of the person who is
expressing the rule’s meaning or content.70 To quote Wittgenstein,
whose philosophy of language has influenced many of the most radical
critiques of textualism and originalism, “there is an understanding of the
rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call
‘obeying the rule’ and ‘going against it’ in actual cases.”71 Among other
things, this critique implies that the real meaning of a constitutional rule
can only be shown in its applications, and that it cannot be articulated
“once and for all” without absurdity or arbitrariness.72
D. Three Positive Methods of Non-Textualist and Non-Originalist
Interpretation
We now turn to three influential modes of constitutional decisionmaking that reject textualism and originalism in favor of something else.
We earlier called this “something else” constructivism (as opposed to
interpretivism) because of its inclination to admit to the fact that it
constructs rather than finds meaning in the Constitution. One might say
that constructivism is to interpretivism as legal realism is to formalism:
the first sees the act of interpretation as inescapably grounded in a
historical dialectic between text and reader, while the second imagines
(as we have already seen) that reading is simply an exercise in
discovering a meaning that is already contained in the text – a meaning
that is in principle immune to any contamination by history. Without
further belaboring this comparison, the specific modes of constructivism
that we will consider in this section are evolutionism, moral readings of
the Constitution, and judicial pragmatism.
determining — not a becoming-conscious of something that is in
itself firm and determined It is a word for the “will to power.”
70
See LOUIS E. WOLCHER, BEYOND TRANSCENDENCE IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 108-14
(2005).
71
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 2, at 81e.
72
Id.
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1. Evolutionism
Perhaps the most obvious and widespread constructivist method is
what might be called evolutionism. Evolutionists view the Constitution
as a “living document” capable of changing over time in response to new
conditions. On this view, the best explanation of the actual state of
constitutional law in America is that it represents a common law process
of development in light of understandings that evolve over time, and that
Article III of the Constitution represents a kind of delegation to federal
judges of the power to develop constitutional meaning (including even
the creation of “new” rights) in accordance with the common law
method.73 Evolutionists subscribe to a sort of “adverse possession”
theory of constitutional law (to borrow Sanford Levinson’s clever
phrase), according to which a proper reading of well-established
Supreme Court precedents on the meaning of any given constitutional
provision trumps both the text of that provision and the intent of its
framers.74 In response to the originalist claim that this method cedes too
much discretion to judges, and therefore is anti-democratic, evolutionists
point out that the common law method has been with us for nearly a
thousand years and that when it is applied in good faith it puts or can put
very real constraints on judicial discretion.75 What is more, at least one
proponent of the common law method of constitutional adjudication,
Professor Cass Sunstein, has responded to originalism’s concern with
the democratic legitimacy of evolutionism by advocating what he calls
judicial “minimalism.”76 This is the view that judges should say as little
as possible in explaining their decisions in constitutional cases — just
enough to justify the result, in fact, without making the kind of broad
pronouncements about the meaning of the constitution that look
“legislative” in a way that offends the democratic sensibilities of
originalists and textualists.77
From legal realism and critical legal studies we have learned much
about the purely logical indeterminacy of the common law, including the
common law process as applied to constitutional decision-making.78 But
73
U.S. CONST. art. III; See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879 (1996).
74
Levinson, supra note 54, at 379 n.19.
75
See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 3.
76
CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
70 (1999).
77
Id. at 71.
78
See JULIUS STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS’ REASONINGS 268-74 (1964).
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remember: the prototypical judges in whom we are interested in this
article conceive of themselves as bound by their chosen methods of
interpretation to achieve the legally “correct” (or the legally “best”)
outcome in every case they decide. Considered from their own
subjective standpoint, at the very end of the process of interpreting
precedent these judges no longer doubt that the “law” requires them to
do what they are about to do.79 One does not have to subscribe to
Ronald Dworkin’s elaborate “Hercules” theory of the judging80 to
believe that a real judge might follow that theory’s precepts in order to
hunt down81 the “right answer” in the case before her, and that once the
judge finds what she believes in good faith to be the right answer she
would experience no doubt about her conclusion. In other words, the
distinction between interpretation and reception applies no less to
evolutionism as a theory of constitutional interpretation than it does to
strict textualism: if the latter reads constitutional text “X” to mean that
“Y” must be done, then the former reads precedents “Z” to mean that
“A” must be done, and in both cases the sense of the interpretation as
such (“Y” and “A”) is simply received without any further questioning
or doubt. To paraphrase Pascal, reception is the “mystical foundation,”82
if you will, of every genuine event of interpreting the Constitution,
regardless of the method that is used.
2. Moral Readings of the Constitution (Descriptive Ethics)
Many of the Supreme Court’s decisions, most notably those
interpreting the “cruel and unusual punishments” clause of the Eighth
Amendment, employ a method of interpretation that is best described as
a kind of descriptive ethics. Thus, for example, the Court in Trop v.
Dulles held that the Eighth Amendment should be interpreted in light of
society’s “evolving standards of decency.”83 The Court has since
employed this interpretive method in numerous death penalty cases,
including Gregg v. Georgia, which upheld the constitutionality of the
death penalty for adult murderers largely on the ground that
“contemporary community values” did not morally condemn the practice
79

See Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 556-59 (1986) (referring to the phenomenon of
the “perceived objectivity of the field” in adjudication and discussing the consequences
of this phenomenon for a judge’s freedom of action).
80
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 3, at 238-75.
81
This is Dworkin’s metaphor. See id. at viii-ix.
82
PASCAL, supra note 47, at 101.
83
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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as a general matter;84 Atkins v. Virginia, which held that executing the
mentally retarded is unconstitutional because of a change in community
values;85 and Roper v. Simmons, which struck down the death penalty as
applied to juveniles on the ground that contemporary community values
in America (and, controversially, elsewhere in the world) had
sufficiently hardened against it to justify an interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment to preclude the practice.86 In response to the originalist
claim that interpretations such as these impermissibly inject the personal
values of judges into the constitutional process, advocates of giving a
moral reading to the Constitution reply that they are only trying to
determine what the Gregg majority called an “objective index” of what
most Americans do in fact hold to be cruel and unusual punishments.87
After all, to locate and follow a deeply embedded moral consensus in
society as the basis of one’s interpretations is not logically the same as
following one’s personal moral values.88 Once the relevant index of
community values is ascertained — for example, by means of counting
the number of jurisdictions that have adopted or rejected the practice in
question — this method binds even those non-originalist judges who
personally disagree with the current state of American moral sentiment
to apply their findings to the case at hand. On the other hand, it is also
true that as a general matter courts do not possess the kind of popular
mandate and investigative resources that Congress has when it comes to
determining what “the people” believe and want. Most originalists and
textualists take this important difference in institutional resources and
competencies to be a sufficient argument against the “social scientific”
method of interpretation that is displayed in decisions like Gregg, Atkins
and Roper.
Beyond the domain of Eighth Amendment law, theories and
decisions that give moral readings to the Constitution sometimes
determine and construct a set of basic national “ideals” surrounding the
notions of liberty, equality, fair treatment, and federalism — ideals that
stand outside of (and behind) the four corners of the text, and that serve
as touchstones for determining concrete disputes about constitutional
meaning. One of the most influential of these approaches has been
Professor John Hart Ely’s theory that the Supreme Court should (and
84
85
86
87
88

428 U.S. 153, 181, 190 (1976).
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181.
See Simon, supra note 33, at 1505-07.
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largely does) follow the meta-constitutional moral value of “procedural
fairness in the resolution of individual disputes,” as well as the general
background value of “ensuring broad participation in the processes and
distributions of government.”89 Similarly, Justice Stephen Breyer’s
recent book, evocatively entitled Active Liberty, describes his own
interpretive method in certain cases as relying on the unwritten (but to
him implicit) constitutional principle of enhancing the ability of ordinary
people to participate in the processes of government.90
In addition, numerous Supreme Court decisions over the past two
centuries also reflect what can only be called a values-based approach to
constitutional interpretation. One notable example is Principality of
Monaco v. Mississippi, where the Court expanded the scope of the
Eleventh Amendment beyond its literal meaning on the ground, as Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes famously put it, that “behind the words of
constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control.”91 A
more recent example in the same general area of law is Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Florida, where even some of the Court’s most ardent
textualists and originalists joined forces with the majority to hold that a
“background principle of state sovereign immunity” lurks behind the
words of the Eleventh Amendment — a principle that determines under
what circumstances Congress may legitimately abrogate the immunity of
state governments from suit in federal court.92 The result of this
reasoning was to impose a limitation on Congressional power that
cannot be found in the text or history of the amendment itself.93 Along
the same lines, no survey of values-based constitutional interpretation
should fail to mention the famous (or infamous) method of “penumbral
reasoning,” which characterizes many of the Warren Court’s decisions
expanding the constitutional scope of individual rights and liberties
against governmental interference. This method was first announced by
Justice William O. Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut, a case in which
the Court struck down a state ban on the use of contraceptives by
married couples.94 It relies on the moral premise that the Constitution as

89
90
91
92
93
94

ELY, supra note 30, at 87.
STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 5-6 (2005).
Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934)
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 123 (1996).
See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
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a whole creates what Douglas called a “zone of privacy” that goes
beyond the specific list of rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights.95
By now it should be clear what kind of response consistent strict
textualists and strict originalists are inclined to give to values-based
methods of constitutional decision making such as those mentioned in
this section. From their point of view, respect for democratic processes
requires judges to obey the constitutional balance that is established once
and for all by what they receive to be the meaning of the Constitution’s
words and its authors’ intent, and to forbear from making new law by
giving Olympian (and democratically illegitimate) readings of valueterms that are almost by definition as vague as they are lofty. Some
textualists and originalists hope to retrieve what the commentator Jeffrey
Rosen calls the “Constitution in Exile” — the Supreme Court’s late
nineteenth and early twentieth century decisions giving a narrow reading
to constitutional provisions like the commerce clause and the Bill of
Rights, before they were allegedly hijacked by “activist judges” who
sought to expand the power of Congress at the expense of the states and
to establish their own (elite and doctrinaire) conceptions of individual
liberty.96 Those who advocate a values-based approach to constitutional
interpretation reply to this attack by revisiting the realist insight that
most legal doctrine is by its very nature inherently malleable and
indeterminate, and by arguing that neo-formalist decision making of the
kind advocated by textualism and originalism is therefore both
disingenuous and potentially anti-democratic. Justice Breyer, for
example, points out that his method has the advantage of making judicial
opinions transparent, inasmuch as it requires judges to give rational and
persuasive accounts of the relationship between the widely shared
background value of participatory democracy and particular judicial
outcomes; whereas textualists and originalists are able to disguise their
reasoning (and thus secretly implement their own political preferences)
by appearing to derive the result of a case mechanically from alleged
constitutional “facts” that may in fact be highly doubtful and contested.97
3. Judicial Pragmatism
Finally, judicial pragmatism is a form of constitutional interpretation
that attempts to produce results that are “good” for the present and the
95

Id.
See Constitution in Exile, Wikipedia,
Constitution_in_exile, (last visited Feb. 11, 2006).
97
BREYER, supra note 90, at 127.
96
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future (according to some method of determining the good) without any
sense of an absolute duty to adhere either to the text, to precedent, or to
the original meaning of the Constitution.98 Of course, this does not
imply that a pragmatist judge will never follow what is called
“precedent” or the “original intent” of the text; rather, she conceives of
her decision to follow them as being solely a function of her judgment
that this course of action produces net social gains which outweigh the
net social gains of any other course of action. In short, a pragmatist
judge thinks that adhering to past understandings and ways of doing
things (including precedent) is a means rather than the end of the process
of interpretation.99 Perhaps the most visible and important modern
method for producing judgments about which interpretation is
pragmatically “best” is cost-benefit analysis, a social science technique
that attempts to supplant both guesswork and a judge’s personal
preferences with a prediction (if not an objective calculation) of the
social effects of competing interpretations of the law.100 According to
Richard Posner, the most vociferous defender of cost-benefit analysis,
this kind of pragmatism encourages judges to doubt even their most
cherished beliefs and understandings about the law in order to avoid the
pitfalls of formalism, whereby a judge can lazily or mindlessly enact her
own unthought prejudices about the meaning of the Constitution under
the guise of seeming to determine what the text or its history
“objectively says” to her.101
Lacking the textualist’s high level of confidence in the capacity of
mere words on paper to constrain and determine the future, the
pragmatist judge looks to other disciplines (primarily economics,
sociology, and psychology) as a way of giving “objective content” to her
decisions and thereby answering textualist and originalist critics who
claim that her interpretations are but a pretense for enacting her personal
preferences. On the other hand, this kind of pragmatism, like all forms
of consequentialist decision making, is open to the philosophical
criticism that it is insufficiently respectful of legal rights simply because
they are legal rights that officials are bound to respect regardless of the
consequences.102 In addition, since the pragmatic method is a function
98

Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 5 (1996).
Id.
100
See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY
PROTECTION 123-28 (2002).
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See Posner, supra note 98, at 18.
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of the values that the judge herself assigns to the variables that she
employs to decide the best outcome, this method can be criticized as
being subjective if not arbitrary in many if not most cases. The critique
of judicial pragmatism thus asserts that it impermissibly usurps a policymaking function that the Constitution specifically assigns to the people’s
elected representatives in Congress and in state legislatures.
E. The Choice Among Competing Methods of Constitutional
Interpretation
In the end it would be useful to know what material the Court
actually does consult (and follow) in order to reach results in
constitutional litigation. Does it decide cases based on the “plain
meaning” of the text? — The “original intent” of the framers and/or
those who ratified the original Constitution or its amendments? — The
“purpose” of the constitutional provision in question as inferred from its
relations with other parts of the Constitution and/or history? — The
“American ethos” that is reflected in an evolving sense of public opinion
(or morality) about the meaning of the text? — A pragmatic balance of
the costs and benefits that would flow from the implementation of
competing constitutional interpretations? — The Court’s prior case law
regardless of the precedent’s alleged fealty (or lack thereof) to the
constitutional text?103 The truth is that at one time or another during its
long history the Supreme Court has employed every one of these
methods, sometimes even in the very same case. And as the foregoing
survey suggests, each method has its advocates in what has become, at
the beginning of twenty-first century, an extremely heated political and
philosophical debate over the proper role of the judiciary in public and
private life.
A judge’s choice among textualism, strict originalism, moderate
originalism and any of the other methods of constitutional interpretation
that this article has surveyed would be purely a matter of unbridled
judicial discretion if there were no accepted meta-principles or metavalues that could act as objective criteria of that choice. In this respect
the question of which method of interpretation judges “ought” to follow
reproduces a familiar problem from the debate between positivism and
natural law theory: namely, the enigma of why a positivist judge ought
to apply only the law as it is rather than the law as it ought to be. To
103

PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-13 (1991) (noting a similar
list of what the author calls six “constitutional modalities”).
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paraphrase Lon Fuller’s well-known description of the “dilemma of
positivism”: on the one hand judges have before them an amoral datum
called the Constitution, which has the peculiar property of creating a
moral duty to obey it; and on the other hand they have a moral duty to do
what they think is just, right, and decent.104 Under these circumstances
just what does the widely valued premise that judges should be faithful
to the Constitution mean? The judicial value of fidelity to the
Constitution, which is arguably made binding by the judge’s personal
oath of office, is not a sufficient criterion to answer this question since
different interpretive methods yield different answers to the question of
what fidelity to the Constitution means in the first place. Likewise, the
requirement of maintaining internal consistency in the application of
judicial method may be a laudable enough value according to some
accounts of the rule of law — Ronald Dworkin’s “law as integrity,” for
example105 — but it provides no criterion for selecting the very
interpretive method that one proposes to apply consistently. It is
obvious, therefore, that the criterion for choosing an interpretive method
must be found either wholly outside the realm of positive law (including
the text of the Constitution) or else within a kind of nether-realm of
“values” that are widely or universally held to be quasi-constitutional in
nature.
It can be said without too much risk that in the United States
mainstream originalists and non-originalists alike largely agree on a list
of meta-values that are not exactly “constitutional,” but that nonetheless
represent a widespread consensus about the moral and political
foundations of the Constitution.
Without attempting to be
comprehensive, the following list of meta-values captures the most
important elements of that consensus: “freedom,” “equality,” “the
balance of powers,” “our federalism,” “representative democracy,” and
“protecting individual rights against majoritarian abuse.” Judging from
the pronouncements of courts and commentators, these meta-values
seem to provide the ultimate criteria for selecting the method of
interpretation that judges should follow in interpreting the Constitution,
and for criticizing or valorizing the methods that they do follow. The
problem is that the meanings of these meta-values in their own right are
hotly contested, with various “camps” of constitutional interpretation
disagreeing about what inferences can or should be drawn from them, as
104

Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law — A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. REV. 630, 656 (1958).
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well as about which of them should take precedence in those cases in
which they conflict with one another.106 Unfortunately, there is no
objective and binding Grundnorm, to borrow Kelsen’s term, which
settles once and for all what the foregoing meta-values mean for the
judicial practice of interpreting the Constitution.107 As is true in every
instance of genuine interpretation, there are many competing metamethods (primarily political philosophies) for interpreting the meaning
and implications of the foregoing list of meta-values, and of projecting
those meanings down to the more mundane level at which judges must
choose some method or other for interpreting the Constitution. Since the
project of describing and evaluating the former methods belongs, strictly
speaking, to the meta-theoretical sphere of political philosophy rather
than the jurisprudential sphere of methods of constitutional interpretation
as such, it lies beyond the scope of this article.
But even if this problem were to be addressed forthrightly, the
question of what method of application a given meta-constitutional value
“requires” is inherently pre-philosophical. In short, what constitutional
“values” such as freedom require are always the product of interpretive
methods (whether explicit or implicit) that generate an expression of that
“requirement.” To do the judge any good, this new “requirement”-text
must be received by her in such a manner that it leaves no doubt about
what she is supposed to do next. The best analogy here is to the word
“Stop” on a stop-sign, which generally leaves no doubt in the minds of
English-speaking drivers: they tend to receive it (without interpretation)
as a kind of Pavlovian trigger for braking their automobiles to a stop.
One might say that the question of what meta-constitutional values
“require” simply reproduces the philosophical problem of interpretation
at a different level, and cannot be answered independently of how one
happens to receive the value in question.
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IV. METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN
THE UNITED KINGDOM
A. The New Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
On March 21, 2005, Parliament passed the Constitutional Reform
Act,108 one of a relatively small number of Acts of Parliament in the last
two hundred years that have made direct changes to the Constitution of
the United Kingdom. The Act provides for a “Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom” to take over both the preexisting functions of the law
lords and certain powers of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council.109 Although the law lords currently sitting in the House of
Lords will become the first members of the new court, the Act does
provide for a new Supreme Court building (not yet selected) that will be
separate from the Houses of Parliament, where the House of Lords
currently sits when exercising its judicial functions.110 The impending
physical separation is not just cosmetic, however — it also symbolizes a
deeper functional separation. Prior to the Constitutional Reform Act, the
law lords could (and often did) speak in legislative debates in the House
of Lords on such sensitive topics as the legitimacy of the death penalty
and whether legal aid should be afforded to indigent criminal
defendants; they also regularly chaired Royal Commissions and
departmental committees.111 Reversing this traditional blending of
powers and functions, the new Act reforms the office of Lord Chancellor
to remove his ability to act as a judge in addition to being a government
minister, disqualifies Supreme Court judges from sitting or voting in the
House of Lords (in addition to their existing disqualification from the
House of Commons), and creates a special commission to make
appointments to the bench based solely on the criterion of merit (albeit
mediated by diversity considerations) instead of political connections.112
Rejecting the clever argument that the law lords need to keep one foot in
the legislative arena so as to better defend the independence of the
judiciary,113 the legislative history of the Constitutional Reform Act
108
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shows that its primary motivation was to bring the judicial system of
Britain more into conformity with the requirements of the European
Convention on Human Rights and the modern constitutional theory of
separation of powers, both of which stipulate that judicial officers should
not also exercise legislative or executive powers.114
While it is too early to predict all of the practical (including
psychological) consequences that these reforms will have for the actual
content of legal interpretations — and for the general principle of
judicial independence — it is clear that the Act’s principal achievement
is to sever the link, which was forged in its present form in the
constitutional compromise of 1876, between the highest court of appeal
in Britain and the House of Lords as a legislative body.115 Although the
Consultation Papers that preceded and informed the adoption of the Act
repeatedly emphasize the virtues and advantages of the separation of
powers, they also expressly affirm that the Act does nothing to change
the traditional principle of parliamentary sovereignty over the content of
British law, including constitutional law.116 Writing with a distinct tone
of disappointment, one leading commentator recently summarized the
basic premise of the new scheme as follows: “the new Supreme Court
would operate in much the same way as the old House of Lords — the
same law lords doing the same old thing.”117 Whether or not this
ultimately turns out to be the case, it would appear, at least as of this
writing, that the Constitutional Reform Act does not attempt to change
either the preexisting rules of parliamentary sovereignty with respect to
the contents of the Constitution or the methods that British judges have
traditionally employed to interpret statutes and develop the common law.
B. The Relationship Between British Parliamentary Sovereignty and
Judicial Methods of Constitutional Interpretation
It must be acknowledged at the outset of our review of the British
Constitution that the concept of judicial methods of constitutional
114
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interpretation, as defined in this article, is fraught with obscurity in the
United Kingdom. Partly this is because there simply is no “Constitution
of the United Kingdom” in the narrow sense of a codified and
comprehensive set of legal rules that define governmental structures and
procedures as well as the government’s relations with its citizens. As
one commentator has put it, the most that one can sensibly say on the
subject is that “over the centuries there has been an incidental
accumulation of ad hoc measures and political arrangements, judicial
decisions, customs of Parliament, conventional assumptions and
enactments of successive Parliaments which in sum could be said to
form the ‘Constitution of the United Kingdom.’”118 One consequence of
the fact that constitutional development in the United Kingdom has
proceeded both randomly and at a glacial pace is that constitutional
theory in today’s Britain is, as Geoffrey Marshall puts it, “a somewhat
disconnected heap of activities.”119 Since the common law makes up a
large portion of the British Constitution, it is perhaps understandable that
English writers have traditionally used metaphors such as “evolution,”
“growth,” “fluidity” and “change” to describe their constitutional
arrangements,120 and that the American concept of a historically
determinate object called the “original intent of the Constitution” sounds
so odd to British ears. According to classical nineteenth century theory,
the rule of law is the most fundamental principle of the British
Constitution, with statutes being not the source but the consequence of
the rights of individuals as defined and enforced by judges interpreting
and applying the common law.121 In the United States it makes sense for
a judge to say that a well-established constitutional precedent is
nonetheless in conflict with the meaning of the Constitution, because
there are two texts involved, one of which is extra-judicial and
hierarchically superior to the other. But this sort of standard positivistic
account of the constraints placed on judges in constitutional cases —
constitutional text X constrains precedent Y — is inapplicable to
thinking about the common law elements of the British Constitution. In
the latter case the question of “methods of constitutional interpretation”
tends to get submerged or lost in the more general problem of how
118
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courts do and should develop and apply what modern legal theory
recognizes to be their own creation — namely, the common law.
A second reason for the relative obscurity of our topic in the British
context is that the task of investigating and determining the sphere of
judicial methods of constitutional interpretation has always been
overshadowed by a certain theoretical obsession with the principle of
parliamentary sovereignty and what that principle means for establishing
the contents of the Constitution. The traditional British view on
parliamentary sovereignty holds that “Parliament (defined as the Queen,
Lords and Commons acting together) ha[s] the right to make or unmake
any law [including constitutional law] and that no person or body ha[s] a
right to override or set aside its legislation.”122 Among other things, this
tradition of parliamentary sovereignty means that a breach of
constitutional convention by Parliament produces no “illegal
consequences” that the courts can address.123 As Lord Reid put it in
Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, although the courts might regard
some things that Parliament does as unconstitutional, or even morally
reprehensible, “[this] does not mean that it is beyond the power of
Parliament to do such things,” and moreover, “[i]f Parliament chose to
do any of them the courts could not hold the Act of Parliament
invalid.”124 Nearly a hundred years have passed since Lord Halsbury
remarked, in Webb v. Outrim, “[i]n the British Constitution, though
sometimes the phrase ‘unconstitutional’ is used to describe a statute
which…is contrary to the tone and spirit of our institutions,…the statute
in question is the law and must be obeyed.”125 Nevertheless, that his
point of view still commands widespread respect, if not support, is
confirmed by a recent remark made by Lord Bingham as chief justice:
“If Parliament were clearly and unambiguously to enact, however
improbably, that a defendant convicted of a prescribed crime should
suffer mutilation, or branding, or exposure in the public pillory there
would be very little a judge could do about it — except resign.”126
The principle that British courts are radically subordinate to
parliamentary supremacy on the meaning of the Constitution —
including basic human rights — is ultimately grounded in John Austin’s
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theory that sovereignty by its very nature cannot be limited by law.127
This point of view is encapsulated in the hackneyed yet oft-repeated
saying that the King (or Queen) can do no legal wrong: a saying that
possesses a great deal more legal truth-value in Britain than in
America.128 One can find this way of thinking about sovereignty most
clearly and strongly articulated in the enormously influential work of the
nineteenth century legal writer A.V. Dicey, who held that British
democracy is ultimately protected by Acts of Parliament rather than by
judges, and who believed that the concept of the rule of law leaves
absolutely no room within it for judicial creativity.129 Inasmuch as life
in Britain during the first part of the twenty-first century is not
demonstrably less democratic, less legal or less free than life in the
United States, the historical absence of American-style judicial
supremacy on the meaning of the Constitution ought to give one pause
about whether it is or ought to be the sine qua non of any democratic
society governed by the rule of law. In other words, judicial supremacy
on constitutional questions may not be the only institutional arrangement
that is consistent with the much-vaunted political value of separation of
powers.
Be that as it may, however, it must be said that the British thesis of
absolute parliamentary sovereignty over the contents of the Constitution
gives rise to a troubling contradiction (or paradox): apparently the
allegedly unlimited sovereign power of the Queen-in-Parliament is
nonetheless somehow limited by the principle that Parliament may not
enact unchangeable laws.130 Here the best analogy is to the old
theological paradox of whether an omnipotent God is powerful enough
to create laws that even He cannot change. What is more, it should be
noted that in theory and in fact the unlimited sovereignty of Parliament
was indeed essentially (if quietly) negated by the Statute of Westminster,
which in 1931 conferred sovereign authority on the parliaments of the
dominion, reserving what can only be called a theoretical or nominal
sovereignty in the United Kingdom.131
Despite the exceptions just noted, it remains the case that “[n]o
[British] court…has claimed jurisdiction to set justiciable limits to an
127
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Act of Parliament,” although every now and then judges have opined, in
dicta or in their extra-judicial writings, that there may be some rights
that are so fundamental to the common law that they are not subject to
disposition by Parliament.132 In evaluating the meaning of this point a
word of caution is due: in thinking about the issue of parliamentary
sovereignty it is important to distinguish the role of the British courts
within England from their role elsewhere in the United Kingdom or
abroad. For example, although the old commonwealth was abolished in
the 1970s, thereby substantially diminishing the appellate jurisdiction of
the Privy Council, in 1994 that body nonetheless invalidated a sentence
of death from Jamaica based on its interpretation of that country’s
written constitution.133 Moreover, the British Constitution actually
serves three systems — England and Wales, Northern Ireland, and
Scotland — and the British courts do have (under an Act of the United
Kingdom Parliament) the power to strike down statutes passed by the
Scottish Parliament if they conflict with the Human Rights Act, which
was passed by the United Kingdom Parliament in 1998 as a way of
incorporating into the Constitution the most significant provisions of the
European Convention on Human Rights.134 Within the context of acts
passed by the British Parliament the situation is otherwise: the Human
Rights Act does not incorporate Section 13 of the Convention, which
requires an effective remedy for violations, and it explicitly deprives the
courts of the power to strike down incompatible legislation passed by the
British Parliament.135 Within Parliament, at least, the notion that a
statute of Westminster on the subject of human rights might be
“entrenched” (i.e., beyond the power of Parliament to modify or repeal)
was widely felt to give too radical an affront to the theory of
parliamentary sovereignty.136 As a consequence, although section 3 of
the Human Rights Act declares that future legislation should be
interpreted as conforming to its provisions unless Parliament clearly
decides otherwise, the Act also limits the courts’ remedial powers to that
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of issuing a more or less toothless “declaration” of incompatibility that
can (but need not) lead to curative legislation.137
In contrast with its treatment of the Human Rights Act, the British
judiciary has interpreted the European Communities Act of 1972, which
is also a part of the Constitution of the United Kingdom, as a declaration
by Parliament that all future legislation should be interpreted to conform
to community legislation, at least unless and until Parliament clearly
declares otherwise.138 As a consequence, a certain degree of what some
commentators have called judicial “activism” has crept into British
constitutional law, leading to a series of decisions that either suspended
or held unenforceable Acts of Parliament that were deemed by judges to
be in violation of community laws and directives. The first and most
notable of these was the Factortame Case, which suspended the
enforcement of a British statute while its constitutionality was tested
before the European Court of Justice.139 That decision was followed in
relatively short order by Regina v. Secretary of State for Employment, ex
parte Equal Opportunities Commission, which held, rather more boldly,
that British legislation concerning part-time employees was
unenforceable because it was in conflict with European Directives.140
Although the latter decision led The Times of London to declare, on
March 5, 1994, “Britain may now have, for the first time in history, a
constitutional court,” no British court has ever intimated that it is beyond
the power of Parliament to repeal or modify the European Communities
Act or even to abrogate the treaty on which it is based.141 Thus, it would
be a gross exaggeration to say that the Factortame line of decisions
foreshadows the advent of American-style judicial supremacy on the
meaning of the British Constitution. Rather, it seems at least equally
plausible to interpret these cases conventionally, as Lord Mackay (then
the Lord Chancellor) did: namely, as garden-variety instances of judges
interpreting one British statute in light of another.142
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C. The Connection Between Judicial Restraint and Textualism
One might think that judges in Britain would tend to be more
creative or “activist” in constitutional cases than judges in the United
States, precisely because their interpretations are always subject to more
or less immediate revision by Parliament and therefore are potentially
less enduring than those given by American courts. However, the
dynamic formula Less Power, Less Boldness seems to have carried the
day: it is well known that there exists a historically embedded culture of
judicial restraint in the United Kingdom. Robert Stevens aptly
summarizes the tenor of this culture when he writes that “[j]udicial
claims to be guardians of fundamental laws are likely to be met with
understandable hostility as a breach of the traditions of parliamentary
supremacy.”143 Supporters of both major parties in Britain have
traditionally sought to emphasize the value of judicial restraint, and this
political fact has had important implications for the methods of
interpretation that judges have employed to construe statutes and
develop the common law. To be blunt about it, for most of its history
the British judiciary has tended to maintain “the law-is-the-law
approach” to legal language.144 On this model of decision-making, the
job of the judiciary is conceived of as positivistic and machine-like:
judges are supposed to find out what the law is (eschewing any inquiry
into what it ought to be) by consulting the “plain meaning” of statutory
words and common law precedents.145 In its purest form this theory of
high formalism and positivism went so far as to exclude the practice of
judicial gap filling by construing statutes according to Parliament’s
“intent.”146 Indeed, it was not until 1993 that the House of Lords
overturned the age-old judicial rule that legislative debates are not
admissible before courts trying to answer questions of statutory
interpretation.147
We have already given a general account of strict textualism — the
judicial method of interpreting constitutional law according to its “plain
meaning.” Postmodern critics of strict textualism, such as Stanley Fish,
have claimed that “[f]ormalist or literalist or ‘four corners’ interpretation
is not inadvisable…it is impossible,” on the ground that every act of
143
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interpretation necessarily generates some conception of the purpose of
Postmodern
its object, and therefore is inescapably creative.148
philosophy of language to the contrary notwithstanding, however, strict
textualism is not regarded as impossible by those who follow it in good
faith, as we saw earlier in the context of discussing the distinction
between interpretation and reception.149 The continuing attraction of
textualism in the United Kingdom is partly explained by a very strong
positivistic streak in mainstream British legal theory, which can be
traced to Jeremy Bentham’s extreme hostility to the common law
process and his equally extreme faith in the power of the written word to
constrain judicial discretion.150 A more recent paean to positivism in
Britain is H.L.A. Hart’s very influential work, which develops the idea
that law is a system of rules, analogous to the rules of games, and that
judicial decision making is and ought to be merely descriptive of the law
as it is and never prescriptive of the law as it ought to be.151 The
argument that the distinction between “Is” and “Ought” is untenable —
because judges have values and political preferences that help shape
their alleged “descriptions” of what the law is — would appear to be
more readily accepted by Americans than it is by the British, who
continue in large measure to trust in the law’s objectivity and autonomy
from politics.152 To illustrate this difference in attitude, contrast the
recent widespread obsession of the American media and the U.S. Senate
with the political and moral values of President Bush’s Supreme Court
nominees with the following rather droll statement from the
Consultation Papers of the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005: “It is
essential that our systems do all that they can to minimize the danger
that judges’ decisions could be perceived to be politically motivated.”153
Although our earlier exploration of the interpretation/reception
distinction will not be repeated here, there are two additional factors that
deserve special mention in the context of the modern British version of
strict textualism. The first pertains to the purely technical quality of
148
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legislation in the United Kingdom, where there exists a separate and
formally apolitical institution — the Parliamentary Counsel Office —
the main role of which is to draft legislation so as to give effect to
government policy.154 One consequence of the existence of this office is
better draftsmanship, and it has been alleged (not unfairly, I might add)
that “parliamentary legislation…lays down policies far more clearly than
Congressional legislation in the United States.”155 The second notable
factor pertaining to British textualism is what J.A.G. Griffith calls the
“strikingly homogeneous collection of attitudes, beliefs and principles”
that are held by most of the judges on the British bench — a set of
cognitive attributes that Griffith characterizes as being both conservative
and illiberal.156 One might reasonably expect the plausibility, if not the
attraction, of strict textualism to increase in proportion both to the clarity
of statutory texts and to the homogeneity of the reactions of one’s fellow
judges to those texts. Robert Stevens notes that the idea that judges
receive and interpret legal texts the way they do because they have
“inarticulate premises” that have been caused and coordinated by
historical influences is “a concept…that English lawyers have
traditionally claimed does not apply in England,” even if they are willing
to admit that it does apply in the United States.157 However naive or
politically convenient this view may be, it has nonetheless influenced
public policy in a variety of ways. Consider, for example, the way the
newly created British Supreme Court will perform its functions under
the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005.158 It is arguable that the United
States Supreme Court always sits en banc in part to minimize the effects
of individual bias; but the Constitutional Reform Act authorizes the new
British Supreme Court to sit in panels of three on the express theory that
the adverse effects of selection will be minimal in England, where “the
stiff upper lip of objectivity will prevail” regardless of who is sitting on
the bench.159
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D. Evolutionism and Judicial Creativity
Despite what has just been said, it would be wrong to think that
constitutional theory in Britain has completely failed to discover or
appropriate the insights of American Legal Realism. In some of their
more candid moments modern British judges have been willing to strip
away the veneer of formalism that covers the event of judicial decision
making, as in the following passage from an essay written by Lord
Browne-Wilkinson on judicial reasoning: “The features of current
judicial reasoning are…as follows: First, the actual decision is based on
moral, not legal factors. Second, these moral reasons are not normally
articulated in the judgment. Third, the morality applied in any given
case is the morality of the individual judge.”160 Although BrowneWilkinson fails to distinguish between individual morality as the cause
of judicial behavior (the external point of view) and individual morality
as the ground of decisions (the internal point of view), it is notable that
during the past two decades British courts have shown a much greater
willingness to depart from the ancient tenets of strict textualism in
statutory construction and in common law development. Lord Steyn, for
instance, declared in IRC v. McGuckian that old-fashioned literalism had
finally given way to more “purposive methods” for construing Acts of
Parliament, and that “[w]here there is no obvious meaning of a statutory
provision the modern emphasis is on a contextual approach designed to
identify the purpose of a statute and to give effect to it.”161
Even more remarkably, in R (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department, all of the law lords accepted the test of
“proportionality,” according to which judges are supposed to make a
substantive assessment of the “relative weight” of competing interests in
human rights cases — almost as if the court had located a doctrine of
substantive due process hidden somewhere in the dark interstices of the
British Constitution.162 Just as in the United States the implied “right to
privacy” of the contraception and abortion decisions resonates
historically with the now-discredited substantive due process reasoning
of the Supreme Court’s conservative Lochner-era decisions, so too the
heightened attention of British judges to moral or political substance in
human rights cases harkens back to their conservative judicial activism
on matters of taxation during the 1930s, when the House of Lords
160
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construed tax statutes narrowly in order to protect property rights from
allegedly “socialistic” taxation.163 These moralistic trends in recent
British case law can be traced at least in part to the writings of Ronald
Dworkin, which have proven to be very influential within mainstream
British legal theory.164 I am referring, of course, to Dworkin’s wellknown critique of H.L.A. Hart’s positivism, and in particular to
Dworkin’s claim that judicial decision making is an interpretive process
in which moral principles and moral reasoning — including the
“purposes” of the legal system as a whole — must necessarily have a
role to play.165
In a similar vein, many British courts have made use of what can
only be called a substantive interpretation of the common law concept of
the rule of law in order to curb or control abuses of the discretion
exercised by agents of the state. The pace and the scope of this tendency
have substantially increased in recent years, during which a series of
judicial decisions has, as one commentator puts it, “significantly resisted
unfettered discretion, narrowed official immunities and expanded the
grounds of review.”166 It is possible, of course, to explain these
decisions modestly, as garden-variety examples of courts implementing
legislative intention under a modified form of the doctrine of ultra
vires.167 Such an interpretation would bring them into harmony with
Joseph Raz’s well-known claim that the rule of law is a purely formal
concept, since otherwise it would have to be seen as a full-blown theory
of justice, which it has never been.168 However, it is also true that there
is an unresolved academic debate in Britain today about whether these
cases might stand for a much broader principle, namely, that the courts
of the United Kingdom possess “an inherent common law function to set
the bounds of legality” — subject, of course, to the right of Parliament to
override their decisions by legislation.169
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As for the common law elements of the Constitution in general,
Lord Browne-Wilkinson recently expressed what some in Britain might
call a shocking break with the traditional way of conceiving of judges’
relationship with precedent in the following passage from his opinion in
Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Lincoln City Council:
The theoretical position has been that judges do not
make law or change law: they discover and declare the
law which is throughout the same. According to this
theory, when an earlier decision is overruled the law is
not changed: its true nature is disclosed, having existed
in that form all along. . . . [But] in truth, judges make
and change the law. The whole of the common law is
judge-made and only by judicial change in the law is the
common law kept relevant in a changing world.170
To keep the common law “relevant in a changing world” implies some
method of interpretation according to which the task of keeping-relevant
is to be performed and evaluated. From the standpoint of our topic, it is
not enough to say that in the 1960’s the House of Lords finally changed
an age-old tradition by allowing itself to overrule its own earlier
decisions; in addition, one is entitled to ask by what method the court
will exercise its power to overrule (or retain) precedent. Nor is it enough
to say, as Lord Chancellor Kilmuir did in 1954, that “the law ‘must play
its part in the modern scientific state…the law should be brought in to
help in the solution of the great problems of the modern State;’”171 in
addition, one is entitled to ask what method of “science” the court will
employ.
If it is true, as Robert Stevens says, that modern British courts have
reclaimed some responsibility for keeping the common law in line with
the needs of society,172 it is also true (as Stevens himself acknowledges)
that “English judges are adept at providing the fig leaf of judicial
objectivity” in explaining their decisions.173 To the extent that British
judges actually believe that their fig leaf of objectivity is a full suit of
clothes, they are following in good faith the method of constitutional
interpretation that we have called textualism. On the other hand, to the
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extent that Lord Browne-Wilkinson is correct in implying that the
personal morality of judges is both the cause and the ground of their
decisions, then the fig leaf of objectivity is truly a fig leaf, with the result
that British “law” is not law, properly speaking. To be an exercise of
legal interpretation (as opposed to the implementation of personal
preference) judges must follow, in good faith, some legally valid method
of interpretation that they consider to be binding on them — whether this
method is what we earlier described as “textualism,” “originalism,”
“evolutionism,” “moral readings of the Constitution,” “judicial
pragmatism,” or something else.
On October 28, 1998, Lord Lester asserted in the House of Lords
(col.1968) that judges in Britain had become a third branch of
government during his time at the bar.174 But if this is so, they have not
become a third branch of government in the American sense, for as we
have seen, in the United States the question of the legitimacy of judicial
methods of constitutional interpretation occupies a leading position in
legal theory and judicial practice. In contrast, it must be said that British
law currently does not make its methods of interpretation into a question
or problem. Wittgenstein once said, “What the eye doesn’t see the heart
doesn’t grieve over.”175 Judicial and academic eyes in the United States
see clearly (some might say too clearly) that the contents of
constitutional interpretations are necessarily linked, if not determined, by
the methods used to generate them. So far this has largely escaped the
penetrating gaze of British judges and academics, who do not think
explicitly “enough” about the problem of methods of interpretation:
explicitly enough, that is, if one’s goal is to isolate and think about them
in their own right, considered apart from the more general problems of
parliamentary sovereignty, judicial restraint in statutory interpretation,
and the contents of the common law. But who knows? Perhaps the new
British Supreme Court will begin to generate the kind of political
controversy over its methods of interpretation that the United States
Supreme Court has generated over the past forty years. To achieve that
result, all it needs to do is begin rendering decisions that Parliament
acknowledges to be beyond its power to change, thereby stirring up the
competing social forces whose oxen are either curried or gored, and
directing the inevitably fervent attention of these forces towards the
judiciary. If and when that happens, British constitutional theory will
174
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become more like its American counterpart, and, if I may be permitted to
say so, the world’s many legal systems will become both less
heterogeneous and less interesting.

